Indonesia signs a trade deal with Washington and a security pact with Canberra while still flying to Moscow

The period opened with one of the most consequential trade moves Indonesia has made in years. On February 19, President Prabowo Subianto sat across from Donald Trump in Washington and signed the US-Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. Under the deal, Jakarta agreed to eliminate tariffs on more than 99 percent of American goods, accepted restrictions on digital trade barriers, and committed Indonesian businesses to buying roughly $33 billion in American products -- including $15 billion in US energy, $13.5 billion in commercial aircraft, and $4.5 billion in agricultural goods. In exchange, Washington cut the tariff rate on Indonesian exports from 32 percent to 19 percent, with zero-tariff treatment for 1,819 product lines covering palm oil, rubber, electronic components, and textiles. The deal delivered the market access Indonesian exporters badly needed. It also bound Jakarta more closely to Washington's economic orbit, with provisions that analysts noted would constrain Indonesia's digital and financial engagement with China.

Just two weeks before the Washington summit, on February 6, Prabowo and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed the Treaty on Common Security in Jakarta. The agreement commits both countries to consult whenever a serious threat to shared security arises, authorizes joint exercises and embedded military officers, and provides a framework for coordinated responses -- though it falls short of a mutual defense guarantee. It builds on the 2024 Defense Cooperation Agreement and updates the 1995 Keating-Suharto security pact. For Indonesia, the treaty cements Australia as its most active security partner in the immediate neighborhood.

Indonesia's military modernization continued to tilt toward France. The first three of 42 Rafale fighter jets arrived at Roesmin Nurjadin Air Base in Sumatra in late January, with three more expected in April. The $8.1 billion Rafale order, combined with an ongoing Scorpene submarine program through Naval Group, makes France Indonesia's largest defense equipment supplier by contract value. Indonesia's defense ministry ranked second in government spending for 2026, with a budget of 187 trillion rupiah -- though salary costs still absorb roughly half of that.

On April 13, Prabowo flew to Moscow for his third visit to Russia in less than a year, meeting Putin to discuss energy cooperation and cheap oil supplies. The same day, in Washington, Indonesia's defense minister announced a new Major Defense Cooperation Partnership with the United States, covering military modernization, training, and joint exercises. The simultaneous announcements were widely read as a deliberate display of Prabowo's multi-alignment doctrine: picking no side, collecting benefits from all. Indonesia's engagement with Russia remained limited to energy and diplomatic dialogue -- no defense contracts and no endorsement of the Ukraine war.

The relationship with China remained the most complicated. In mid-March, a China Coast Guard vessel rammed an Indonesian patrol boat in the waters around Natuna Besar, then forced the release of a Chinese trawler Indonesia had detained inside its 12-nautical-mile territorial limit. China's Foreign Ministry claimed the waters as "traditional Chinese fishing grounds," a framing Indonesia rejected. The incident reopened old concerns about Chinese encroachment into Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). At the same time, Indonesia's trade deal with the United States contained provisions restricting China-linked digital services, adding economic friction to the maritime tension.

On Gaza, Indonesia's posture drew both praise and controversy. Jakarta pledged to contribute up to 8,000 troops to a US-backed International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza, and Prabowo joined Trump's Board of Peace alongside Israel in February. Domestic critics questioned whether the deployment compromised Indonesia's solidarity with Palestinians. In late March, Jakarta suspended the deployment and paused Board of Peace talks, citing unresolved questions about the mission's mandate. Indonesia continued airdrops of humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the period.